Monday, May 30, 2005

Australian Financial Review - The end of globalism

Sunday, May 22, 2005

The Pentagon's New Map (PNM) An Interview with Brian Lamb

Provides a thorough review of PNM and will serve as the basis for preparing material for Tom's Future in Review appearance.brian lamb interviewThe Pentagon's New Map (PNM)

Sunday, May 15, 2005

[ Shostak Studios, Inc. ]leigh bureau promo mag

Leigh Bureau - Company Profile, Research, News, Information, Contacts, Divisions, Subsidiaries, Business Associations

Leigh Bureau - W. Colston Leigh, Inc.

andrew zoli

paul saffo

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larry lessig

Leigh Bureau - W. Colston Leigh, Inc. articles by Tom barnett

Tom Barnett speakers bureau

Monday, May 09, 2005

Strategic News Service - Future in Review 2004

Monday, May 02, 2005

Links from NRSP Update

This is a test of a blog capture of the link references in the NRSP Update newsletter.Blogging the newsletter as a companion resource may be useful - Let's see.

Link 1. New Map Game

Support The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

∑ Order The Pentagon’s New Map from Amazon (Hardcover) or (Paperback).

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www.newrulesets.com/map_now.php

∑ Participate in The New Map Game. Please join us in investigating what war and peace may look like in the coming decades. Note that due to game mechanics and the unique nature of this event, attendance is limited to 100 participants.



www.newmapgame.com

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Contents > Support The Newsletter From Thomas P.M. Barnett

Books

Blueprint for Action : A Future Worth Creating

Building Wealth One House at a Time : Making it Big on Little Deals

Come to Me: Stories

Confronting Reality : Doing What Matters to Get Things Right
Don't Shoot the Dog! : The New Art of Teaching and Training

Edicts of Asoka (Midway Reprint Series)

Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done

Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (Book 6)

The Chinese Century : The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the
Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job

The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries

The Pentagon's New Map

The Shadow of the Wind

The Zanzibar Chest: A Story of Life, Love, and Death in Foreign Lands

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( ) Iceland’s Sigur Rós

A Child's Hanukkah

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Mac OS X 10.4 Tiger Family Pack - 5 Client [DVD]

Microsoft OneNote 2003 [Capture all your information in one place]

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Contents >
Glossary
updated 29 April 2005
Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and "dirty" in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both "old" and "new," Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the "big one" and all the lesser includeds. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

Lesser includeds — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the "Big One" against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the "lesser includeds." Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser includeds, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser includeds were the whole ball game.

Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this "overmatch" means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the "first half" of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the "second half" of peace, to include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. "Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved." The Pentagon’s New Map, Pg 198.

Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced "moo-twah"), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s "ozone hole," where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world’s security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.